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Glick: Labor-Management Cooperative Programs: Do They Foster or Frustrat

NOTE

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATIVE
PROGRAMS: DO THEY FOSTER OR
FRUSTRATE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Labor-management cooperative programs1 are proliferating 2
and bear the imprimatur of the Department of Labor."
The Department of Labor has taken a strong position in support of
labor-management cooperation as an important prerequisite to
America's return to preeminence in the world marketplace. [Former] Secretary of Labor William E. Brock has said that our country must develop a 'solid atmosphere of cooperation, based on the
1. As used here, "labor-management cooperative programs" refer to two distinct types
of worker participation: (1) quality of worklife programs ("QWLs") and (2) employee stock
ownership plans ("ESOPs"). See infra text accompanying notes 78-175 (discussing in more
detail QWLs and ESOPs).
2. A New York Stock Exchange study published in 1983 reports that "fourteen percent
of all companies employing one hundred or more people were involved in some kind of quality
of work life effort." Moberly, New Directionsin Worker Participationand Collective Bargaining, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 765, 778 & n.101 (1985) (citing NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
PEOPLE AND PRODUCTIVITY: A CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE AMERICA (1983)). To put that
statistic in perspective, those companies employed fifty-two percent of American workers. Id.
ESOPs have become popular over the last decade and, by the end of 1988, "1,500 companies
with 1.5 million employees were majority-owned by ESOPs." Wayne, Some Lessons from Avis
for UAL Buyout, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, § 3 (Business), at 4, col. 3, col. 4.
3. See Schlossberg & Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management
Cooperation, 3 THE LAB. LAW. 11, 12 (1987).
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concept of worker dignity and equality and grounded in a mutual
respect for collective bargaining,[which] enables both unions and
management to maintain individual integrity while working for the
4
good of all.'

In other words, while the Department encourages labor-management
cooperation to foster economic competitiveness, the Department also

affirms its commitment to the individual integrity of both labor and
management, which is vital to collective bargaining. Do labor-management cooperative programs foster economic competitiveness and
promote the individual integrity of both labor and management to
further collective bargaining? Can labor-management cooperative
programs be utilized to implement these dual national
labor policies
5
?
adversaria
inherently
is
bargaining
if collective
Labor-management cooperative programs tend to blur the line
between employees and management, 6 thereby undermining the collective bargaining process. For instance, employees who participate
in a management-initiated quality of worklife program (hereinafter
4. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
5. See Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of Section
8(a)(2), 27 B.C.L. REV. 499, 515 (1986) [hereinafter Kohler, Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2)].
[T]wo principles are key to ...collective bargaining .... The first is that, given
the nature of the ordering process and the distribution of power in the society in
which it occurs, employees should have the unimpeded freedom to form self-controlled and self-directed organizations that stand at arm's length from the entity
that employs its members and through which employees can participate in framing,
administering and adjusting the private law that governs the employment relationship. The second basic principle is the well-known one of free collective bargaining,
viz.,
that the outcomes of the ordering process are to be determined by the parties
themselves, free from governmental intervention. Several assumptions are imbedded
in these principles. The first is that between employer and employed inherent conflicts of interest exist which are a function of the authoritarian nature of the employment relationship itself. Further assumed is the idea that employees will be able
to gain, protect and further recognition of their peculiar interests and goals only
through formation of an autonomous group that can act to check management's
inherent power. Since a conflict of interests is regarded as inherent to the employment relationship, the use of economic pressure is seen as having a legitimate and
appropriate role in the parties' ordering process. Thus, in ...collective bargaining
• .. conflict is viewed as a natural rather than a morbid characteristic, and its
expression through the strike, lockout and the like is regarded as integral to a system that permits the parties to seek their self-interest in establishing the order of
their relationship. These features of collective bargaininghave led to its characterization as an adversarialsystem.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
6. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 21 (stating that "[mI]any of the most
promising experiences in labor-management cooperation deliberately set out to blur distinctions between manager and worker.").
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"QWL") 7 may forego the selection of a bargaining representative
because management has convinced these employees that they may

better effectuate their ideas and protect their interests through the
QWL rather than through a union. Under section 2(5)8 of the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA"), 9 as interpreted
by the courts,' 0 management may initiate a QWL so long as it is not
a "labor organization" and the QWL serves limited purposes, such
as the informal interchange of ideas between management and employees. 1 Meanwhile, subjects such as wages, hours or other working conditions must be negotiated at arm's length by equal bargain7.

See Kohler, Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), supra note 5, at 516-17.
Unlike collective bargaining, the genesis of the various [cooperative] schemes of
worker participation has come not from those who are to be enabled through their
use to participate, i.e., the workers, but rather from members of the academy. Although the structural details, specific goals, the degree of involvement in the managerial decision-making process and the level and manner in which it is to occur vary
among them, the [cooperative] schemes share a common intellectual heritage: all
stem from the research and theories of the human relations school of Elton Mayo
and its successors-the organizationalbehaviorists (OB)-whose work has been
advanced on behalf of management. . . . A central concern of the relationistshas
been the discovery and application of means by which to achieve employee acceptance of and cooperation in securingmanagement's goals. The strategy for obtaining
these ends has been to make management techniques more responsive to worker's
[sic] social needs, thereby overcoming among workers the feeling of alienation and
powerlessness that these theorists posit as obstructive to cooperation. These techniques emphasize changes in the way management leads, designs work and structures the organization that will permit workers' greater autonomy and discretion in
performing their tasks; in short, participation. From the application of these techniques will arise a sense of accomplishment from the work itself, enhanced feelings
of self-worth, and in turn, improved morale, cooperation and productivity among
workforce members. It is for these reasons that [cooperative] schemes are most
often conceived of as a style or theory of management, or as a managerial ethic.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
8. National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).
The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
Id.
9. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935).
10. Compare NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 84 (7th Cir.) (finding that an "employee communications committee" was a labor organization because although this "particular
mechanism [may not be] a labor organization in the ordinary sense. . . [t]he statutory definition . . . is very broad"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971) with NLRB v. Streamway Div. of
Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 292 (6th Cir. 1982) (reinterpreting the statutory construction of section 2(5) and condemning the "inflexible attitude of hostility toward employee committees.
... (quoting NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J., dissenting))).
II. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d at 294-95.
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Moreover,

section 7 of the NLRA Is permits

employees to choose whether or not to have a union represent them
in collective bargaining, and section 8(a)(2)'I prohibits employers
from interfering with that choice. Management can subtly interfere
with an organizing campaign by initiating a QWL in an effort to
persuade employees to vote against the union.' 5 A no-union election
vote by employees bars another union election for at least a year,' 6
which results in a bargaining procedure initiated at the pleasure of
management and not by a compulsory duty to bargain. Consequently, labor-management cooperative programs can chill the col12. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.
Id.
13.

National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) ...

Id.
14. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). This section
provides in pertinent part that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it. . . ." Id.
15. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR ON THE WAGNER ACT, S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 9-11 (1935).
The second unfair labor practice deals with the so-called 'company union problem.' It forbids an employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it...
This bill does nothing to outlaw free and independent organizations of workers
who by their own choice limit their cooperative activities to the limits of one company. Nor does anything in the bill interfere with the freedom of employers to establish pension benefits, outing clubs, recreational societies, and the like, so long as
such organizations do not extend their functions to the field of collective bargaining,
and so long as they are not used as a covert means of discriminatingagainst or in
favor of membership in any labor organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982). This section
provides in pertinent part that "[n]o election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any
subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have
been held." Id.
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lective bargaining process."
Although labor-management cooperative programs are instru-

mental in pursuing economic competitiveness,

8

they upset the bal-

ance of bargaining power envisioned by Congress in the NLRA.' 9
17. See Gardner, The National Labor Relations Act and Worker ParticipationPlans:
Allies or Adversaries?, 16 PEPPERDINE L. Rav. 1, 14 (1988).
The unsettled interpretation of section 2(5) by the [National Labor Relations]
Board and the circuit courts, coupled with the failure of the Supreme Court to specifically define the boundaries by which management and employees are permitted
to 'deal with' each other, suggests that a management-sponsored cooperative committee, which is organized for the furtherance of quality of worklife, may be deemed
a labor organization. As more QWL programs are adopted and union membership
continues its decline, employers may face challenges from unions charging that
worker participationplans have been created simply to chill unionism.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
18. For example, one goal of QWLs is to improve the quality of goods and services, and
increase production. See infra text accompanying notes 78-127 (discussing QWLs in detail).
19. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
FINDINGS AND POLICIES
Section 1. [§151.] The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the
efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in
the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow
of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of
commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing
diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or
disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargainingpower between employees who do not possessfull
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or otherforms of ownership associationsubstantially burdens
and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargainingpower
between employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

5

[Vol.
Hofstra
Labor
Law
Journal
Hofstra
Labor
and
Employment
Law Journal, Vol. 7,
Iss.7:11 [1989], Art. 5

Collective bargaining, the keystone of the NLRA,

an equilibrium between labor and management.

1

°

is premised on

Periodically, one

side or the other upsets that equilibrium. For instance, after the Sec-

ond World War, Congress perceived an imbalance and, overriding a
Presidential veto, enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 to

curb union abuses caused by unfettered union organizing.22 Presently, management occupies the ascendant position because of judicial and administrative decisions that restrict management's duty to
bargain over entrepreneurial decisions, 23 decisions made in furtherance of the current policy of economic competitiveness. The decisions
which limit management's duty to bargain also reflect the traditional
belief that the collective bargaining relationship is inherently adversarial; for example, management's prerogatives should not be shared
with labor by submitting cost-saving proposals to the bargaining process.24 In 1988, Congress sought to restore the equilibrium by enacting the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (here20. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962) (stating that
"[tihe ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free and voluntary
collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace.").
21. See supra note 19. But see Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective BargainingLaw, 4 INDus. REL. L.J. 450 (1981) (arguing that the theoretical notion of equilibrium is a sham devised by ownership to dominate labor and that collective
bargaining laws seek to legitimize heirarchy and domination).
22. See Kaynard, Deregulationand Labour Law in the United States, 6 HoFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 1, 7-8 (1988).
The end of World War II brought on a rash of strikes as unions sought to
recoup the cut in take-home pay which resulted from wage freezes during the war
and aggravated by the changeover from war to peace. With it also came a reaction
against some union practices. In 1947, the Wagner Act was drastically amended by
the Labor-Management Relations Act, referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act. Opposed by labor as a 'slave labor' act, it was nevertheless passed by Congress, over
the veto of President Truman. The Taft-Hartley Act declared that certain activities
and practices of labor organizations were 'unfair labor practices,' e.g., secondary
boycotts, jurisdictional disputes. The closed shop authorization was replaced by a
30-day union shop provision. Prestrike notices were required when the parties were
renegotiating or modifying a collective bargaining agreement. The labor injunction
was reactivated to a limited degree; the N.L.R.B. could seek injunctions from the
federal district courts in certain situations and the Attorney General could seek injunctions in a national emergency strike or lockout under specified procedures.
Id.
23. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,concurring) (stating that
"[n]othing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding [certain] managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control."); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
24. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 678-79 (stating that "[m]anagement
must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the
running of a profitable business." (footnote omitted)).
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inafter "WARN"). 25 Among other things, WARN provides that
employers must give employees 60 days notice of plant closings26 so
that unions can cope with the effects of the closing, although employers are not obligated to bargain with the union over the decision

to close a plant.

Significantly, Congress did not choose to amend

the stated policies contained in the NLRA2s and, thus, is still com-

mitted to a policy of promoting collective bargaining as the primary
form of employee participation in labor-management relations.2 9

Consequently, it appears that the three branches of government
are coordinating their efforts to simultaneously implement two national labor policies; first, the policy of collective bargaining, and
second, the policy of fostering economic competitiveness. Although
these policies are sometimes complementary, they are nonetheless

often in tension with one another."0 For example, one way to foster
economic competitiveness is to encourage employers to maximize

their profits by reducing operating costs. An employer can reduce
operating costs by relocating operations from a unionized plant to a
non-unionized plant located in another part of the country, or even
outside of the United States. 31 Consequently, the employer becomes
more economically competitive by sacrificing the collective bargain-

ing relationship with the union.
On the other hand, under ideal conditions, labor-management

cooperation can foster economic competitiveness and promote collective bargaining. For example, in providing a forum for discussing
employee morale, a QWL can be instrumental in creating workplace
innovations such as employer-sponsored childcare."2 The benefits to
25. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, §§ 2101-2109, 102 Stat. 890
(1988).
26. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, § 2102, 102 Stat. 890 (1988).
27. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 686.
28. See supra note 19 (setting forth these policies).
29. See id.
30. In First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., the Supreme Court developed a balancing test to
deal with the tension between the policies of fostering economic competitiveness and promoting
collective bargaining. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). "[B]argaining over management decisions that
have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only
if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs
the burden placed on the conduct of the business." Id. at 679. In applying the balancing test to
the circumstances of the case, the Court held that an employer did not have to bargain over a
decision to shut down part of its business because "the harm likely to be done to an employer's
need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's
participation in making the decision ..
" Id. at 686 (footnote omitted).
31. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d. Cir. 1961).
32. This hypothetical assumes that employee morale is a suitable subject of discussion
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the employer are manifest: (1) employee performance would improve
because employees would not be distracted by childcare problems;
(2) absenteeism would decline; and (3) the employer would be able
to project manageable wage increases because employees' childcare
expenses would be eliminated. The benefits to the employees are also

clear: employees would be more content because: (1) the employer is
addressing their needs; (2) childcare professionals are teaching and

caring for their children in a properly equipped facility; and (3) their
children can play with other children in a supervised environment.
Simultaneously, the employer and the union can negotiate a collective bargaining agreement that accommodates the employer's need
to stabilize the cost of labor over the next few years and the employees' need for childcare. In this scenario, labor-management cooperation works in tandem with collective bargaining to implement both
labor policies.
Unfortunately, labor-management relations do not occur under
ideal conditions, and employers do not generally invest in long-term
innovative programs."a Rather, to compete in the marketplace, employers try to maximize profits by minimizing costs. Furthermore, in
reaction to marketplace reality, the policy of fostering economic
competitiveness has eclipsed the policy of promoting collective bargaining between two equal bargaining partners. 4
by members of a QWL and would be compatible with a narrow reading of section 2(5). See,
e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1982).
33. See Bennet, U.S. Leaders: No Vision, All Expediency, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1989,
§ 4 (The Week in Review), at 21, col. 2, col. 3. (stating that "[b]usinessmen turn quick profits
without regard to the country's long-term economic and environmental interests."); cf. R.
DAFT, MANAGEMENT 119-20 (1988).
In the early 1980s, Wait Disney Productions was not performing well. Net income had fallen consistently. In 1984, Michael Eisner was brought in from Pittsburgh to take over as CEO. One of the major strategic challenges was to turn
around a movie division- Touchstone- that was unprofitable and had no track
record for producing quality films. One of Eisner's long-term goals was to make
Touchstone a major force in the movie industry. This goal had a time horizon of
five years and required the implementation of shorter range plans to bring it into
reality.An intermediate-term objective was to increase production from 6 or 7 to 14
or 15 movies a year. This would take about two years to implement and would make
Disney a viable industry force. The related short-term plans were to make successful
films in the next one to two years. These consisted of bringing in new artists and
some of Hollywood's best performers. Down and Out in Beverly Hills, with Bette
Midler, Nick Nolte, and Richard Dreyfuss, proved to be a successful movie and
helped achieve the short-term objectives. The Color of Money, starring Paul Newman and Tom Cruise, was another short-term plan that succeded.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 689-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court had formulated a balancing test which would take into account only
management's interests and therefore would be "one-sided.").
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To avoid brutal economic measures such as layoffs, plant clos-

ings, relocations and subcontracting, some unions encourage members to participate in employee stock ownership plans (hereinafter

"ESOPs"). 35 Employers can cut costs by using an ESOP to supplement or even replace an existing retirement program.3 6 Since the

market value of the employer's stock will someday determine pension
income, employees who participate in an ESOP are committed to the
employer's future success. 37 Professor Moberly hypothesizes that as

ESOPs proliferate, and the scope of subjects over which employers
are required to bargain diminishes, labor will increasingly demand

board representation to protect its interests. 38 However, federal and
state laws contain conflict of interest provisions that may thwart a
union's plans for board representation, 9 such as the Landrum-Griffin Act40 and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act of 1984
The Court bases its decision on a balancing test. It states that 'bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability
of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of business.'. . . I cannot agree with this test, because it takes into account
only the interests of management; it fails to consider the legitimate employment
interests of the workers and their union. Cf. [sic] Brockway Motor Trucks v.
NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 734-740 (CA3 1978) (balancing of interests of workers in
retaining their jobs against interests of employers in maintaining unhindered control
over corporate direction). This one-sided approach hardly serves 'to foster in a neutral manner' a system for resolution of these serious, two-sided controversies ...
Id. (emphasis in original).
35. For example, the Weirton Steel Company became 100 percent employee owned in
1984 with the help of the United Steelworkers. Wayne, supra note 2, at 4, col. 4.
36. See generally Farrell & Hoerr, ESOPs: Are They Good for You?, Bus. WK., May
15, 1989, at 116, 118 (noting that "[a] corporation gets more tax breaks from an ESOP than
from any other kind of pension plan . . . . [Companies] can deduct their principle payments
because the outlay is treated as a normal cost of maintaining a retirement plan.").
37. See id. at 117.
38. See Moberly, supra note 2, at 769 (stating that "to the extent that courts have
circumscribed the subjects of collective bargaining and access to information . . ., union leadership may find it more and more necessary to resort to [the demand for board membership] in
order to obtain information and input they find necessary to effectively represent their members."); see also Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 73, 77 (1988) (footnote omitted) (stating that an
"emerging form of labor participation in the corporate structure is the increased frequency
with which unions negotiate for representation on corporate boards of directors, usually in
exchange for concessions in collective bargaining."); cf. Farrell & Hoerr, supra note 36, at 122
(maintaining that "[u]nions such as the United Steelworkers demanded full voting rights and
board seats for its members where an ESOP owned a significant share of the company.").
39. See infra text accompanying notes 175-207 (discussing the conflict of interest questions that arise under the Landrum-Griffin Act and the RMBCA when union representatives
seek board representation).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1982). In 1959, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act in response to corruption in the leadership of organized labor. Landrum-Griffin, by introducing
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(hereinafter "RMBCA").*1 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
adopted the view that Congress did not intend labor to participate in
certain managerial decisions.42 Therefore, employee representation
on corporate boards as a form of worker participation is problematic
under present law.
These introductory remarks examine the Department of Labor's
contention that labor-management cooperation can both revitalize
American competitiveness and promote collective bargaining. Arguably, labor-management cooperation conflicts with the adversarial nature of collective bargaining.4 a Should courts struggle to distinguish
QWLs from "labor organizations" as defined in the NLRA? Should
Congress continue to encourage ESOPs through favorable tax legislation? This Note explores the legal problems involved in utilizing
labor-management cooperative programs to implement the policies of
fostering economic competitiveness and promoting collective bargaining between two equal bargaining partners.
Part II of this Note discusses the legal climate in which laborelaborate union reporting requirements, outlawed undemocractic conduct in internal union affairs, and provided union members with a "bill of rights" in such matters as union elections,
eligibility for office and disciplinary procedures. In addition, Landrum-Griflin amended the
unfair labor practice provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 which, among other things
imposed a duty of fair representation upon unions. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON
LABOR LAW 5-6 (1976).
41. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT (1984)

[hereinafter "RMBCA"]:
was approved by the Committee on Corporate Laws (Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law) of the American Bar Association in 1984 and published in
1985... . As of the end of 1985, the [RMBCA] served as the basis for the revision
of the Virginia corporation statute and is being considered as the basis for revision
of corporation statutes in several other states.
STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATION 57 (R. Hamilton 3d
ed. 1986). Its predecessor, the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT (1950), was influential in the
codification of the corporation statutes in more than 36 states. See id.
42. See First Nat7 Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 676-77 (citing with approval Justice
Stewart's concurrence, in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223
(1964)).
43. See Kohler, Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), supra note 5, at 515-16.
The term adversarial . . . carries much baggage with it. This is especially true for
lawyers, for whom the word often conjures up images of our 'give no quarter' litigation system. Unlike litigants, employee and employer are engaged in an ongoing
relationship and are yoked by their mutual dependence. This interdependence-what E. Wight Bakke termed the need for 'mutual survival'--acts to describe the boundaries within which the parties' 'adversariness' will be expressed, and
to limit the amount of actual conflict between them. Indeed, the parties typically
share a substantial commonality of interests, and their state of reciprocal need impels compromise over contested issues. Hence, bargaining often has been described
as a cooperative form of conflict wherein the parties' goal is a mutually acceptable
agreement . . ..
Id. (footnote omitted).
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management cooperatives evolved; 44 for example the judicial/admin-

istrative trend towards limiting management's duty to bargain over
entrepreneurial decisions. Part III describes two popular types of la-

bor-management cooperative plans; QWLs and ESOPs. 41 Finally,
Part IV discusses conflicts of interest that may arise under the

Act when a union representative
RMBCA and the Landrum-Griffin
46
sits in the boardroom.
II.

LEGAL CLIMATE IN WHICH LABOR-MANAGEMENT
COOPERATIVES EVOLVED

First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB47 (hereinafter
"FNM") was a watershed decision. The company, engaged in the
business of providing housekeeping, cleaning and maintenance services for commercial customers, decided to terminate its relationship
with a nursing home because of contractual disputes. 48 The company
discharged its employees who worked at the nursing home and refused to bargain with the union over the decision to shut down that

part of its operations.4 9 The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of
both the National Labor Relations Board5" (hereinafter "NLRB" or
"the Board") and the Second Circuit 5' and held that, absent an express contract provision to the contrary, the company did not have to
bargain over the decision to shut down the operations2 but only over

the effects of that decision.5 The Supreme Court reasoned that
44. See infra text and accompanying notes 47-77.
45. See infra text and accompanying notes 78-169.
46. See infra text and accompanying notes 176-207.
47. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
48. Id. at 668-69.
49. Id. at 669.
50. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979), enforced, 627 F.2d 596
(2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
51. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452
U.S. 666 (1981).
52. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate
freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic
reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's
participation in making the decision, and we hold that the decision itself is not part
over which Congress has mandated
of § 8(d)'s 'terms and conditions' ...
bargaining.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
53. Id. at 677 n.15.
There is no doubt that petitioner was under a duty to bargain about the results
or effects of its decision to stop the work at . . . [the nursing home], or that it
violated that duty. Petitioner consented to enforcement of the Board's order concerning bargaining over the effects of the closing and has reached agreement with
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"[t]he decision to halt work at this specific location represented a
significant change in petitioner's operations, a change not unlike
54
opening a new line of business or going out of business entirely,
and thus was entrepreneurial in nature. Although the* Supreme
Court limited the holding to the particular facts of FNM,55 the language of FNM invited management to expand its entrepreneurial
prerogatives in a variety of other factual circumstances."6
In Otis Elevator Co. (hereinafter "Otis IF'), the NLRB expanded the FNM holding to cover the situation in which an employer closed down its research and development activities in New
Jersey and consolidated them with a larger and more modern operation in Connecticut.5 7 In Otis I, the Board had ordered Otis to bargain with the union over the transfer and consolidation.58 The union
and Otis then filed petitions with the D.C. Circuit for review of the
Board's decision and order, and the Board filed a cross-application
for enforcement of its order.59 However, the D.C. Circuit granted the
Board's motion to remand for reconsideration in accordance with the
Supreme Court's holding in FNM.60 On remand, the Board found
that Otis was not compelled to bargain with the union over the consolidation because "the decision turned not upon labor costs, but instead turned upon a change in the nature and direction of a signifithe union on severance pay.

Id.
54.

Id. at 688 (emphasis added).

55. Id. at 686 n.22 (stating that "[i]n
this opinion we of course intimate no view as to
other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcon-

tracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular facts.").
56. Id. at 682-83.
Management's interest in whether it should discuss a decision of this kind is
...complex and varies with the particular circumstances. If labor costs are an
important factor in a failing operation and the decision to close, management will
have an incentive to confer voluntarily with the union to seek concessions that may
make continuing the business profitable. At other times, management may have
great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and
exigencies. It may face significant tax or securities consequences that hinge on confidentiality, the timing of a plant closing, or a reorganization of the corporate structure. The publicity incident to the normal process of bargaining may injure the possibility of a successful transition or increase the economic damage to the business.
The employer also may have no feasible alternative to the closing, and even goodfaith bargaining over it may both be futile and cause the employer additional loss.
Id. (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
57. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
58. 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981), rev'd, 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
59. See Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (discussing the prior procedural history of
the case).
60. See id.
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cant facet of [Otis'] business." 61 Moreover, following the Supreme
Court's holding in FNM, and citing Justice Stewart's opinion in
FibreboardPaper Products Corp. v. NLRB,62 the Board in Otis H
held that "excluded from [mandatory subjects 6f bargaining under]
section 8(d) of the [NLRA] are decisions which affect the scope,

direction, or nature of the business. "63

Critics of FNM and Otis H claim that a politicized Board wel-

comed the opportunity to expand the FNM holding. 64 They argue
that the Supreme Court's decision that management need bargain
only over the "effects" of an entrepreneurial decision,65 rather than
61. Id.
62. 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964).
[T]here are . . . areas where decisions by management may quite clearly imperil
job security, or indeed terminate employment entirely. An enterprise may decide to
invest in labor-saving machinery. Another may resolve to liquidate its assets and go
out of business. Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a
duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the
core of entrepreneurialcontrol. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to
terminate employment. If, as I think clear, the purpose of §8(d) is to describe a
limited area subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of the corporate enterprise or
which impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded from
that area.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. at 893.
64. See, e.g., Gregory & Mak, Significant Decisions of the N.L.R.B., 1984: The Reagan
Board's "Celebration" of the 50th Anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act, 18
CONN.

L.

REV.

7-8 (1985).

The labor law jurisprudence of the [NLRB] coalesced and matured in 1984,
consonant with the political and economic ideology of the Reagan administration.
This occurred in a series of related decisions on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of
the [NLRA, one of which is Otis II]. Although no single case set labor law on a
new course, the Board's most important decisions had the cumulative effect of giving priority to employer institutional interests over those of organized labor. ...
The Board, roundly denounced by employers as the tool of organized labor at the
inception of the [NLRA], is now canonized by employer interests and vehemently
condemned by union leaders as the malevolent ally and instrument of ownership.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
65. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 681-82.
[T]he union must be given a significant opportunity to bargain about . . . matters
of job security as part of the 'effects' bargaining mandated by § 8(a)(5). And, under
§ 8(a)(5), bargaining over the effects of a decision must be conducted in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, and the Board may impose sanctions to insure
its adequacy. A union, by pursuing such bargaining rights, may achieve valuable
concessions from an employer engaged in a partial closing. It also may secure in
contract negotiations provisions implementing rights to notice, information and fair
bargaining.
Moreover, the union's legitimate interest in fair dealing is protected by
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the decision itself, upsets the equilibrium in bargaining power between labor and management by tipping the scale in management's
favor.66 On the other hand, some commentators argue that FNM
and its progeny upset the equilibrium only slightly; one commentator
posits that, pragmatically, there is no difference between decision
and effects bargaining. 7 In any event, in Otis II, the NLRB ignored
the Supreme Court's statement that FNM should be limited to its
particular facts.6 8 Instead, the Board expanded FNM by further limiting management's duty to bargain over entrepreneurial decisions
which nonetheless vitally affected employees.69 Moreover, the Board
has expanded Otis II to apply in other factual circumstances.7 0
§ 8(a)(3), which prohibits partial closings motivated by antiunion animus, when
done to gain an unfair advantage. Under § 8(a)(3) the Board may inquire into the
motivations behind a partial closing. An employer may not simply shut down part of
its business and mask its desire to weaken and circumvent the union by labeling its
decision 'purely economic.'
Id. (citations omitted).
66. See Gregory & Mak, supra note 64, at 44-48.
67. See Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First
National Maintenance, 5 IND. REL. L.J. 402, 421 (1983) [hereinafter Kohler, Distinction
Without Differences].
The goal of decision and effects bargaining are essentially identical: to afford
the affected employees' bargaining representative notice sufficiently in advance of
the implementation of an operational change to permit the union the opportunity,
through bargaining, to preserve jobs and otherwise protect the interests of employees. Further, their mechanical features are alike. Within their respective spheres,
the scope of bargaining is equally broad, and in both, the union has the right to
secure information under the employer's control which the union needs in order to
bargain intelligently. Finally, and most critically, the duties attach at virtually the
same time, i.e., sufficiently in advance of the implementation of a change as to permit the union a 'meaningful opportunity' to bargain. In the final analysis, the differences between the two duties seem more of degree than kind. The emphasis in decision bargaining is on an exploration of alternatives which the employer may find
attractive enough to forego the contemplated change. In effects bargaining, the focus is on ways to ameliorate the impact of the change's execution, particularly
through discussions concerning opportunities for continued employment for affected
workers at the employer's other facilities. The duties then, are actually variations on
a theme.
Id.
68. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666; see also supra note 55 (providing
the Court's statement).
69. See supra text accompanying note 63.
70. See, e.g., Gar Wood-Detroit Truck Equip. Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 113 (1985) (finding
no duty to bargain over decisions to subcontract out work previously performed by employees
and presently performed by independent contractors at the employees' location, inasmuch as
the decision did not turn on labor costs but rather on overhead costs); Hawthorn Mellody, Inc.,
275 N.L.R.B. 339 (1985) (finding no duty to bargain about moving delivery operations inasmuch as the decision "turned upon a change in the nature and direction of the business,"
although labor costs were "a motivating factor"); see also Arrow Automotive Indus. Inc. v.
NLRB 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988). In Arrow Automotive Indus. Inc., the majority held that
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Responding to outcries by organized labor about its diminished
bargaining position as a result of FNM and Otis II, Congress enacted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act7"
(hereinafter "WARN"), which directs that employers give 60 days
notice of mass layoffs, plant closings and partial plant closings under
certain circumstances. 2 Remedies provided in WARN include civil
penalties7" and a federal cause of action for damages in the event of
employer non-compliance.74 However, federal courts are not authorized to enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff.75 Thus, while WARN
protects workers from the effects of management decisions vital to
their welfare, workers are still unable to participate in those
decisions.
Labor-management cooperative programs began to proliferate
concomitantly with the issuance of judicial opinions and administrative orders limiting labor's influence in important entrepreneurial decisions. Part III discusses two types of labor-management cooperative programs that began to flourish in a bargaining climate
favorable to management: the QWL program, a management-sponsored type of cooperative program which addresses the problems of
worker alienation and powerlessness, 76 and the ESOP, a financial device which enables employees to purchase stock in the employer
corporation.77
III.

TYPES OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS

A. Quality of Worklife Programs
During the 1980s, in an effort to improve profitability based on
the theory that contented workers are more productive workers,
FNM had set forth the proposition that an employer never has a duty to bargain over a decision to close part of its business and relocate operations. Id. In this case the Fourth Circuit
disagreed vehemently with the Board's "labor costs" standard, stating:
As a general matter, the Board's labor-costs standard provides scant guidance or
predictability to companies faced with fundamental business decisions. It also establishes an exception to the [FNM] decision that threatens to swallow its rule. As one
commentator has noted, the Board's standard is problematic in itself because 'man-

agement decisions may turn on labor costs and involve a fundamental change in the
business.'
Id. at 227 (citation omitted).
71.

National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, §§ 2101-2109, 102 Stat. 890

(1988).
72.
73.
74.

National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, § 2102, 102 Stat. 891 (1988).
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, § 2104, 102 Stat. 893 (1988).
Id.

75. Id.
76. See also supra text and accompanying notes 7-17 (discussing QWLs generally).
77.

See also supra text and accompanying notes 35-38 (discussing ESOPs generally).
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management began to develop QWLs to open channels of communication with employees about efficiency, quality control and humanizing the workplace. 78 Although QWLs differ widely from company to
company, one proponent offers this general definition of the QWL as
"[a] process by which an organization attempts to unlock the creative potential of its people by involving them in decisions affecting
their worklives. ' 79 QWLs are now a staple of American life. A recent report claims that fourteen percent of all companies that employ one hundred or more people (encompassing 52 percent of the
American work force) are involved in some kind of QWL program.80
The same report finds a twenty percent increase in productivity as a
result of QWLs.81
QWLs also have the support of the federal government. The
Department of Labor embraced labor-management cooperation
wholeheartedly as part of the Reagan Administration's program of
economic competitiveness. 8 2 President Reagan's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness endorsed greater labor-management cooperation.83 Moreover, federal funding became available to unionized
employers "for the purpose of improving labor/management relationships, job security, organization effectiveness, enhancing economic development or involving workers in decisions affecting their
job including improving communication with respect to subjects of
mutual interest and concern."84

The QWL movement espouses high principles. For example,
AT&T and the Communications Workers of America (hereinafter
78. See supra text accompanying note 7.
79. See Gardner, supra note 17, at 5 (citing Guest, Quality of Worklife-Learning From
Tarrytown, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1979, at 76).
80. See Moberly, supra note 2, at 778.

81. Id.
82. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
83. See Moberly, supra note 2, at 777 (citing FMCS Funds For L-M Committees, 114
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 294 (1983)).

84. See Moberly, supra note 2, at 777; see also Kohler, Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), supra note 5, at 502 n.6.

Pursuant to the Labor-Management Cooperation Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §§ 173(e),
175(a), 186(c) (Supp. IV 1980) . . . the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-

vice (FMCS) has been instructed to assist in the development of joint labor-management committees at individual work sites, or on an area or industry wide basis.
The Labor Management Cooperation Act is intended to comport with the model of

free collective bargaining established by the [NLRA] thus, its terms restrict the
grant assistance to committees established at individual work sites to unionized employers, 29 U.S.C. § 175(b)(1). In fiscal year 1982 for example, the [FMC]
awarded $I million in grants. 108 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 211 (1982).
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"CWA") entered into an agreement creating a QWL program.8 5
The agreement set forth the following principles:
(1) "[T]he essential component of a [QWL] effort is a process
which increases employee participation in the decisions which affect their daily work and the quality of their work life.""8
(2) The goals of QWL efforts are "to employ people in a profitable and efficient enterprise" and "to create working conditions
which are fulfilling by providing opportunities for employees and
groups at all levels to influence their working environment." 8
(3) "[T]he basic human values of security, fairness, participation and individual development" are inherent in the QWL
program. 88
(4) QWL efforts are premised on the proposition that "employees are responsible, trustworthy and capable of making contributions when equipped with the necessary information and
training."89
QWL proponents claim that cooperation based on mutual respect and trust is a more effective prescription for healthy corporations than is confrontation between labor and management.90 Buttressing that argument was the success of industrial relations under
the AT&T/CWA agreement until August 1989, when the CWA
called strikes against NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, Pacific Telesis and
Ameritech. 1 Apparently, QWLs are not a panacea for labor-man85. Reprinted in pertinent part in Moberly, supra note 2, at 775-77.
86. Id. at 775 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. (footnote omitted).
88. Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Id. (footnote omitted).
90. R. MARSHALL. UNHEARD VOICES: LABOR AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
WORLD

A COMPETITIVE

163-64 (1987).

After surveying the reasons for declining U.S. productivity and international
competitiveness in some basic American industries, William H. Batten, chairman of
the New York Stock Exchange, concluded that 'worker participation programs are
essential for a climate in the workplace that will allow the United States to continue
to outproduce all other nations of the world.
Id.
91.

Crowe, Union Movement Takes to Street, Newsday, Sept. 3, 1989, at 76, ol. 1, 2.
Strikes against NYNEX and two other regional telephone companies, Bell Atlantic and Pacific Telesis, began on Aug. 6; a fourth strike against Ameritech began
the following week. The four strikes involved 200,000 members of the CWA and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. By last week, all-except
NYNEX-had settled.
The central issue at all the companies-except for Ameritech, where wages
were the main point of contention-was the demand by management that a portion
of health-insurance costs be shifted to workers. AT&T Co. and all the regional
phone companies except NYNEX reached settlements with the union by dropping
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agement relations. However, the CWA's willingness to call a strike
against AT&T regional phone companies demonstrates that, in unionized companies, QWLs do not supplant collective bargaining.9 2
On the other hand, QWL opponents claim that non-unionized
employers use QWLs to combat union organization and to chill collective bargaining between two equal bargaining partners.93 Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA 94 makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization.. . -95 "Labor organization" means

"[1] any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and [2]
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers [3] concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 98
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,9 7 the Supreme Court construed
"labor organization" very broadly, in accordance with the legislative
history of section 2(5).98 The Court concluded, based on the findings
of the NLRB trial examiner, that the "Employee Committees" at
each of Cabot Carbon's plants, as well as the "Central Committee"
consisting of the chairmen of the several plant committees, were "labor organizations" within the meaning of section 2(5). 9 In coming
to that conclusion, the Court tracked the language of section 2(5)
and evaluated: (1) the structure of the committees; 100 (2) the functhe health cost-shifting demand and, instead, agreeing to health-care systems using

designated doctors and institutions.
Id.
92. See id.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra text and accompanying notes 15-17.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
Id. (emphasis added).
National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982).

97. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
98.

Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 211 n.7.

The term 'labor organization' is phrased very broadly in order that the independence of action guaranteed by section 7 . . . and protected by section 8 shall extend
to all organizations of employees that deal with employers in regard to 'grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.'

This definition includes employee-representation committees and plans in order that
the employer's activities in connection therewith shall be equally subject to the application of section 8.

Id. (citing to S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEgISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

99.

AcT 1935, at 2306 (1985)).

Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 203.

100. Id. at 205-06.
Pursuant to a suggestion of the War Production Board in 1943, respondents decided

to establish an Employee Committee at each of their plants. To that end, respon-
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tion the committees served; and (3) the subjects about which the

employer and the committees communicated. 10' Based on its concludents prepared, in collaboration with employee representatives from their several
plants, a set of bylaws, stating the purposes, duties and functions of the proposed
Employee Committees, for the transmittal to and adoption by the employees in establishing such Committees. The bylaws were adopted by a majority of employees
at each plant and by respondents, and thus, the Employee Committees were established ....
In essence, the bylaws state: that the purpose of the Committees is to provide a
procedure for considering employees' ideas and problems of mutual interest to employees and management; that each plant Committee shall consist of a stated number of employees (ranging from 2 to 3) whose terms shall be one year, and that
retiring members, with the help of plant clerks, will conduct the nomination and
election of their successors; that each plant Committee shall meet with the plant
management at regular monthly meetings and at all special meetings called by management, shall assist the plant management in solving problems of mutual interest,
and that time so spent will be considered time worked; and that 'It shall be the
Committee's responsibility to: . . . Handle grievances at nonunion plants and departments according to procedure set up for those plants and departments.'
Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. Id. at 213-14.
Consideration of the declared purposes and actual functions of these Committees shows that they existed for the purpose, in part at least, 'of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.' It cannot be, and is not, disputed that, by the terms of
the bylaws, which were accepted both by the employees and by respondents, the
Employee Committees undertook the 'responsibility to,' and did, '[h]andle grievances [with respondents on behalf of employees] at nonunion plants and departments according to grievance procedure set up [by respondents] for these plants and
departments . . . . 'It is therefore as plain as words can express that these Committees existed, at least in part, for the purpose of 'dealing with employers concerning
grievances . ... '
Moreover, although none of the Employee Committees attempted to negotiate
any formal bargaining contract with respondents, the Employee Committees, at the
regular Employee Committee-Management meetings held during the period here
involved, made proposals and requests respecting such matters as seniority, job classification, job bidding, working schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, a merit
system, wage corrections, and improvement of working facilities and conditions. Respondents' plant officials participated in the discussion of these matters and frequently granted the Committees' requests.. . . Respondents say that these activities
by the Committees and respondents' officials do not mean that the Committees were
'dealing with' respondents in respect to those matters, because, they argue, the proposals and requests amounted only to recommendations and that final decision remained with respondents. But this is true of all such 'dealing,' whether with an
independent or a company-dominated 'labor organization.' The principle distinction
lies in the unfettered power of the former to insist upon its requests. Whether those
proposals and requests by the Committees, and the respondents' consideration of
and action upon them, do or do not constitute 'the usual concept of collective bargaining,' we think that those activities establish that the Committees were 'dealing
with' respondents, with respect to those subject matters, within the meaning of
§ 2(5).
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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sion that the Employee Committees were "labor organizations," and
the undisputed fact that Cabot Carbon established and controlled
those committees, 10 2 it followed that Cabot Carbon unlawfully dominated, interfered with and supported a labor organization in violation
of section 8(a)(2). 0 3
Recent decisions of the NLRB and the Circuit Courts of Appeal have disregarded Cabot Carbon and ignored the legislative history of the NLRA. 0 1 For instance, in NLRB v. Streamway Division
of Scott & Fetzer Co., 0 5 the Sixth Circuit condemned an "inflexible
attitude of hostility toward employee committees" 06 and found that
a joint in-house representation committee was not a labor organization. 1 7 In addition, in GeneralFoods Corp.,08 the Board found that
a employer-initiated job enrichment program was not a labor
organization. 0 9
The law in this area is unsettled because the Supreme Court has
not spoken to this issue since Cabot Carbon and because the Sixth
Circuit has departed, in Streamway, 10 from the rationale of Cabot
Carbon. One commentator complains of the uncertainty, arguing
that when a non-unionized employer develops a QWL, that employer
risks being sanctioned for unlawfully dominating, interfering with,
and supporting a labor organization."'
102. See supra text accompanying note 99.
103. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 203.
104. See Gardner, supra note 17, at 11.
105. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
106. Id. at 292.
107. Id. at 294. But see Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 1985)
(distinguishing Streamway and holding that an employee sales assistant committee established
during a union organization campaign and which was representational in nature was a "labor
organization" within the meaning of section 2(5)).
108. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
109. See General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235 (stating that this program was not a
labor organization because employees never achieved an agency relationship to a larger body,
no employees got together as employee representatives, the program did not have the structure
to be such an organization, and the employees dealt with management only on a one-to-one
basis).
110. 691 F.2d at 292.
[L]ogic and experience under the [NLRA] since [Cabot Cabon] dictate that not all
management efforts to communicate with employees concerning company personnel
policy are forbidden on pain of violating the [NLRA]. An overly broad construction
of [section 2(5)] would be as destructive [to] the objects [of] the [NLRA] as ignoring the provision entirely.
Id.
I11. See Gardner, supra note 17. "This article has demonstrated the continuing uncertainty employers face as they develop QWL programs." Id. at 18-19. "Equally uncertain for
employers is the question of whether a particular form of employee cooperation will be deemed
a labor organization by the Board or the courts." Id.
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The question also arises whether or not a QWL, which is found
to be a "labor organization," requires the application of a per se rule
of employer interference and support. In Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 112 the professional employees at an architectural firm decertified the union and developed, together with the employer, several
in-house joint committees to "discuss and formulate proposals for
changes in employment terms and conditions."" 3 In holding that the
employer did not "interfere with" or "support" a labor organization,
the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the NLRA protects the employees' free choice of bargaining representative.'" 4 The Ninth Circuit
explained:
For us to condemn this organization would mark approval of a
purely adversial model of labor relations. Where a cooperative arrangement reflects a choice freely arrived at and where the organization is capable of being a meaningful avenue for the expression
of employee wishes, we find it unobjectionable under the
[NLRA].115

As demonstrated in the introductory remarks to this Note, however, Congress intended an adversarial model of labor relations when
it enacted the NLRA."i6 Professor Kohler notes that the term "adversarial" carries with it excess baggage 17 and that a more precise
definition of "adversarial" in the context of labor relations would be
"a cooperative form of conflict.""" To comport with the NLRA, the
essential ingredient in this cooperative form of conflict is equal bargaining power between employer and employees." 9 In Hertzka &
Knowles, the Ninth Circuit established that, based on the particular
112.
113.
114.

503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 629.
Id. at 629-30.
Central to the [NLRA] is the facilitation of employee free choice and employee
self-organization ....
[Section] 8(a)(2) is . . . a means to that end. . . . Literally,
however, almost any form of employer cooperation, however innocuous, could be
deemed 'support' or 'interference.' Yet such a myopic view of § 8(a)(2) would undermine its very purpose. . . . Thus the literal prohibition of § 8(a)(2) must be
tempered by recognition of the objectives of the NLRA.

Id.
115. Id.at 631.
116. See Kohler, Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), supra note 5, at 499-50.
117. See id. at 515 (claiming that this term evokes contrasting ideas and the belief of a
"give no quarter" legal system).
118. See id. at 516.
119. See, e.g., Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)) (stating that unequal bargaining power disrupts such things

as commerce and economic recovery).
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circumstances, the employees were able to bargain at arm's length
with the employer and were not stifled by the employer's involvement in the committees. 20 On the other hand, based on the same
facts, the NLRB adopted the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, who found that:
Under the conimittee system which prevails at the Respondent, the
employees, whose every action at committee meetings is under the
intimate observation and surveillance by management representatives, cannot function as an independent labor organization and the
committee becomes little more than a tool of management which
perforce dominates and interferes with the administration of the
committees.121
The disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and the Board in
Hertzka & Knowles accentuates the need for clarification of the policies underlying section 8(a)(2). Professor Kohler argues that the
policies underlying section 8(a)(2) and the NLRA, involve the
choices Congress made to protect the associational freedom of employees and to promote the private ordering of the employment relationship without government intervention.' 22 If section 8(a)(2) was
designed to implement only those Congressional choices, bargaining
could take place through cooperative organizations (assuming it was
the employees' choice to forego union representation). However, the
legislative history concerning section 8(a)(2) indicates that Congress
intended the government to have a role in the private ordering of
employment relationships. 23 Congress intended the NLRB to decide, subject to judicial review, the question of whether an employer's participation with its workers in a cooperative organization
actually prevented the employees from making a free choice to
forego union representation. 24 An employer may participate in a co120. Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 630. A finding of violation "must rest on a showing that the employees' free choice, either in type of organization or in the assertion of demands, is stifled by the degree of employer involvement at issue." Id.
121. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 210 (10
ed. 1986).
122. Kohler, Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), supra note 5, at 549.
123. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 121, at 200 (citing
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR ON THE WAGNER ACT, S.

REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1935)) (implying that employee organizations may
form recreational organizations but cannot interfere with any collective bargaining, and forbidding management interference with labor organizations but not with employee recreational
units).
124. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 121, at 200.
The so-called 'company-union' features of the bill are designed to prevent interference by employers with organizations of their workers that serve or might serve
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operative organization with its employees for the purpose of bargain-

ing if, on an examination of all the facts and circumstances, it appears that the employees were not coerced or influenced to forego

union representation. 12 5
Consequently, based on the circumstances

of Hertzka &

Knowles, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of a per se rule of employer
interference comports with the policies underlying section 8(a)(2).
Labor and management are still debating the merits of QWL
programs. QWLs may increase productivity, but one commentator
recently noted that a satisfied worker is not always a more produc-

tive worker,1 26 thereby refuting the idea that QWLs foster economic
competitiveness. Moreover, unions can challenge the legality of a
QWL by showing that, by participating with employees in the QWL,
the employer interfered with the employees' free choice of a bargaining representative. 2 7 Therefore, although a unionized employer can
develop a QWL without risking NLRB sanction, a non-unionized
employer who develops a QWL runs the risk that the NLRB will
find an unfair labor practice. Thus, section 8(a)(2) assures that
QWLs will not be used to undermine collective bargaining between
equal bargaining partners.
B.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans

During the last decade, millions of employees became shareas collective bargaining agencies ....
It is impossible to catalog all the practices
that might constitute interference, which may rest upon subtle but conscious economic pressure exerted by virtue of the employment relationship. The question is
one of fact in each case. And where several of these interferences exist in combination, the employer may be said to dominate the labor organization by overriding the
will of employees.
Id.
125.
126.

Id.
Samuelson, What Makes a Worker Work Harder?,Newsday, Oct. 4, 1989, at 77

(Viewpoints), col. 1.
Everyone assumes that a satisfied worker is always a more productive worker. Not
so. Of course, some people love their jobs, work hard, do well and feel appreciated.
And others detest their work, hate their bosses and work poorly. But some workers
are satisfied precisely because they aren't working hard. They have cushy, well paid
and secure jobs. And some productive workers are dissatisfied precisely because they
are working hard. Their jobs are demanding and stressful.
'There are hundreds of studies disproving the automatic link between job satisfaction and work effort,' says psychologist Barry Staw of The Haas School of Business at the University of California (Berkeley).
Id.
127.

See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 630 (holding that it must be proven that

the workers lacked "a freedom of choice" in their choice of a representative).
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holders in American industry by participating in ESOPs.'28 ESOPs
were invented by Louis 0. Kelso, a lawyer and investment banker,
who believes that the economy benefits from the "democratization of
capital.' 1 29 Proponents claim that ESOPs: "(1) foster economic democracy within the private sector; (2) increase productivity; and (3)
create a more equitable distribution of wealth by giving employees a
share of the capital assets of this country."' 3 0 In the early 1970's,

Kelso convinced Senator Russell Long of Louisiana to promote ESOPs." a' Senator Long believed that companies would encourage employees to participate in ESOPs if ESOPs produced tax advantages,
and he persuaded Congress to give ESOPs special tax treatment as
part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(hereinafter "ERISA").' 32 In addition to the favorable tax treatment
afforded ESOPs by ERISA, several states have also enacted statutes
to encourage employee ownership through ESOPs.' 3
128. See Wayne, supra note 2 (stating that "by the end of [1988], some 1,500 companies with 1.5 million employees were majority-owned by ESOPs.").
129. See Roel, Creator Says ESOPs' Fables are the Story of the Future, Newsday,
Sept. 12, 1988, Part III (Business), at 6. Louis 0. Kelso is a 75-year-old lawyer and investment banker who grew up in rural Colorado during the Depression. Id. He is a great believer
in "democratization of capital." Id. Kelso argues that "whoever owns the industrial plants is
going to make the big money," and workers cannot afford to become owners through earnings
or savings. Id. Kelso also contends that banks have a habit of lending to the rich, keeping the
poor undercapitalized. Id. Therefore, Kelso decided that the way to make workers into capitalists was to finance their way into ownership using ESOPs. Id. By owning a piece of the company, workers could then increase their wealth through the labor of machines, not just by their
own toil. Id. Moreover, Kelso believes that ESOPs do more than help individual workers. Id.
"The rich can't possibly consume enough to advance the economy." Id. "The only way for the
economy to grow is for workers to consume more, and it's the duty of a capitalist democracy to
enable every citizen to earn a good living." Id. at 7.
130. Moberly, supra note 2, at 770 (footnote omitted).
131. See Roel, supra note 129, at 7 (encouraging Senator Long to promote ESOPs with
tax treatments).
132. Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. 1, § 2, 88 Stat. 829, 832 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
1001 (1974)).
133. See, e.g., 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 8244 (West) (state policy is to encourage employee
ownership); Employee Ownership Act, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347 (West) (California State
Department of Economic and Business Development to assist employee buy-outs); see also ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1303-1313 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (Illinois Department of Commerce to
grant state loans to encourage employee takeover and ownership of closing industrial plants; in
order to qualify, the firm must be 60 percent employee owned and employees must be allowed
to vote their shares); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 146) (1982) (Act declaring broadened ownership of capital an important state policy and finding that ESOPs are an important means of
achieving that goal); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 11-602 (1985) (Act exempting sales
of stock to an ESOP from Maryland state securities registration requirements); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 156B, § 40 (Law. Co-op. 1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 162-L:2 (1988) (Act
creating a community development finance authority which promotes ESOPs by providing
technical assistance and loans); 1983 N.Y. LAWS 1476 (Department of Commerce to assist
employee-owned enterprises in various ways, including the issuance of bonds to help finance
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All ESOPs begin with the creation of a trust.' The trust then
purchases the company's stock'3 5 on the open market, from individual stockholders or from the company's treasury. Eventually, the
trust allocates shares of stock to individual employee accounts, and
employees who are vested in the ESOP receive the cash value of the
stock when they retire or leave the company."3 '
The leveraged ESOP, Kelso's specialty, 3 7 provides a method of
financing the trust's purchase of the company's stock. The company
takes out loans from banks, insurance companies or other financial
institutions, which are secured by the company's assets. 8' The proceeds of these loans are then used to purchase the company's stock,
which is held in trust for the company's employees.' 39 Furthermore,
the company uses its earnings to repay the loans. 140 Capital is available at favorable rates because lenders get taxed on only 50 percent
of what they earn on an ESOP loan.' 4 ' Since the ESOP is set up as
a trust under federal pension law, the company can deduct interest
payments on the debt and principal payments because the outlay is
treated as a cost of retaining a retirement plan.'42 Moreover, the
company can deduct dividends paid on the stock held by the ESOP,
so that double taxation of dividends does not apply in the ESOP
43
situation.
Employees of a company in financial distress can use an ESOP
to make wage and benefit concessions or to buy the company outright. This is the most publicized use of the ESOP and can be very
successful.' 44 Naturally, the company must make money to pay the
employee buyouts at rates below prime; in order to qualify, assisted companies must be owned

and controlled by a majority of the employees).
134. See Mendels, Takeovers from Within. N.Y. Teachers Employees Ins and Outs of
Ownership, Newsday, Sept. 10, 1989 (Business), at 90, 86.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Levine, Nathans & Hoerr, Louis Kelso's Baby is Making Daddy Proud, Bus.
WK., May 8, 1989, at 130.

138. Id. (stating that "the amount of capital borrowed by U.S. ESOPs has soared
fifteenfold, from $1.2 billion in 1986 to an annual rate of about $18 billion in the first quarter

of 1989, according to the Center for Employee Ownership in Oakland, California.").
139. Id.
140. See L. Kelso & P. Kelso, Why Owner-Workers are Winners, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
1989, § 3 (Business), at 3.
141. See Farrell & Hoerr, supra note 36, at 118.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Roel, When Workers Hold Control, Newsday, Sept. 12, 1988, Part 3 (Business), at I (where Avis employees have already begun repayment at three times the average
speed and are heavily committed to their work). But cf. Stockton, Tearing Apart Eastern
Airlines, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 36. Eastern Airlines was forced to sell
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debt service on the loan. However, even if the company does not
make money, the employee-owners may not be able to oust inept
management because employee ownership does not necessarily mean
employee control. For example, if the framers of the ESOP do not
provide for the employees to vote for their shares individually, a trustee will be designated to vote all the ESOP shares as a block. 14 5
Sometime employees vote on a one person, one vote basis, notwithstanding the number of shares they hold. 46 Thus, even if the employees own a substantial block of stock in the company, they may
not be able to exercise control unless they seek and attain board
147
representation.
Companies use ESOPs to add to or replace an existing retirement program. 148 For instance, a company can use an ESOP to fund
a section 401(k) defined-contribution plan,' 49 a tax-sheltered account
that enables employees to set aside a percentage of their gross salary, with the company matching the employee's contribution.' 5 ° The
company can contribute to the plan through dividend payments,
which are deductible by the company because double taxation on
dividends does not apply in the ESOP situation.' 5 ' As a result of
participating in the ESOP, the employees have a stake in the company's success because retirement benefits depend on stock
performance. 52
An ESOP can also be used to erect a takeover defense.' 53 For
example, Polaroid recently used an ESOP to fend off a hostile takesome of its airline to keep from bankruptcy. Id. Subsequently, however, Eastern did file a
bankruptcy petition. Id.

145. See, e.g, PROXY STATEMENT-PROSPECTUS OF EASTERN AIRLINES (Oct. 15, 1986)
at 105 (holding that shares acquired pursuant to the terms of the 1984 Wage Investment
Program of Eastern Airlines are in a trust and are voted on as a block by the Plan Trustee).
146. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 2, at 774 (stating that the Weirton Steel ESOP
provides for a one-employee, one-vote system with respect to most issues, although the number
of shares allocated to employees is based upon relative pay).

147. See infra text and accompanying notes 176-207 (discussing the problems posed
under federal and state law by union members or their representatives sitting on a corporate
board of directors).
148. Farrell, Smart & Schiller, Stuffing Nest Eggs with ESOPs, Bus. WK., Apr. 24,
1989, at 124.
149. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (Supp. IV 1986).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Farrell & Hoerr, supra note 36, at 119.
153. Farrell, Smart & Hammonds, Suddenly, Blue-Chips are Red-Hotfor ESOPs, Bus,
WK. Mar. 20, 1989, at 144. While ESOPs date from the mid-1950s, takeover phobia in executive suites accounts for the current ESOP rage. Id. An ESOP can be an awesome takeover
barrier, since employees are more likely to vote their shares for the management they know
than for the raider they fear. Id.
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over by Shamrock Holdings'" and successfully defended the validity
of the Polaroid ESOP. 15 However, initiating an ESOP defense at
the eleventh hour harms non-employee shareholders who wish to
profit by tendering shares to the hostile bidder.' 56 Therefore, courts
will reject an ESOP defense if they perceive a blatant attempt at

entrenching management.

57

Prevailing legal opinion is that the trus-

tee must tender to a hostile bidder those shares not allocated to
ESOP participants in the same proportion that employees have ten-

dered their allocated shares.' 58 The Department of Labor's view, on

the other hand, is that the trustee has a fiduciary duty to maximize

the value of the ESOP. 159 Therefore, the trustee must tender to the
hostile bidder all the unallocated shares. 60 If the Department's view

prevails in the federal courts, an ESOP defense will be worthless.' 6 '
For an ESOP to work as a takeover defense, employees must
feel loyal to present management or else take their chances with the
raider.6 2 Thus, management must demonstrate a commitment to labor-management cooperation. 63 For instance, the Delaware judge
who upheld Polaroid's takeover defense based her decision partly on
154. See Farrell & Hoerr, supra note 36, at 119, col. 2.
Polaroid is among the 50% of all publicly owned companies that are incorporated in
Delaware, where the law prevents a hostile acquirer from merging with a target
company for at least three years unless the bidder wins 85% of the stock. Polaroid
didn't take any chances-it raised its ESOP's stake to 22%.

Id.
155. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989)
(holding that the validity of the ESOP was upheld because it promoted productivity and succeeded under "entire fairness" scrutiny).
156. Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d at 273. "If an acquirer offers a substantial premium
in a tender offer, [non-employee] stockholders might decide to tender with the idea that they
will use the cash proceeds either for other investments or for personal items." Id.
157. See, e.g, Earle, Managers Still Have a Lot to Learn About ESOPs, Bus.
MONTHLY, July 1989, at 81.
The decision by the Delaware Chancery Court indicates that an ESOP defense
will be upheld if employee ownership can be shown to have a bottom-line benefit to
stockholders, if the setup of the ESOP trust does not dilute earnings, if provisions
are made for plan members to vote by secret ballot and if the plan provides for
employee participation in corporate governance. Furthermore, the court indicated
that if such a trust has been seriously considered but not adopted before a takeover
offer, or even if a small preexisting plan is suddenly expanded toblock a hostile
offer, it will be validated if these 'entire fairness' standards have been met.

Id.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.

161.

Id.

162.
163.

See id. at 82.
Id.
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the company's history of labor-management cooperation.6 4 Moreover, an employee of Polaroid, which is itself a non-union company,
now sits on the board of directors. 6 5
Critics of the ESOP defense point out that companies increase
their debt by implementing the plan. 6" Furthermore, if the company
uses stock already in its treasury, the value of the outstanding shares

becomes diluted.0 1 Nonetheless, ESOPs will likely play an increasingly important role in corporate strategy during this era of
takeovers.' 68

Initial studies on the effects that ESOPs have on profits and
productivity are encouraging, 69 but additional empirical research
must be done regarding their effect on job security and worker satisfaction. 70° ESOP detractors claim that in the typical ESOP, stock
ownership is heavily skewed toward management, that ESOPs are
being used by employers as substitutes for regular, more diversified
164.

Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d at 260.
[An] important aspect of Polaroid's culture . . . is its emphasis on employee
involvement in the success of the company. In its early years, when Polaroid was a
small company, Dr. Land promoted a 'family' atmosphere by maintaining open and
informal lines of communication between workers and management and by encouraging employees to share in management's goals for growth and profitability ...
As the company grew, other efforts were made to maintain a high level of employee
identification with the company. A profit sharing program for all employees was
instituted in 1969 and, in the 1970's, Polaroid created a very small employee ownership plan under . . . statutes then in effect.

Id.
165. See Farrell & Hoerr, supra note 36, at 123 (quoting "Marian J. Stanley, [Polaroid's] director of market research and development . . . [who] intends to bring a worker's
perspective to a board filled with lawyers and investment bankers.").
166. See Farrell & Hoerr, supra note 36, at 117.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 116.
169. See MARSHALL, supra note 90, at 196.
Although profit maximization is not necessarily their main objective, the National Center for Employee Ownership claims that studies show ESOP companies to
be 50 percent more profitable than non-ESOP companies. Evaluations also show
that the ESOPs have significantly greater productivity than similar non-ESOP
firms. A survey of ninety-eight firms with employee ownership, sixty-eight of which
were ESOP's found a positive relationship between employee ownership and both
profits and productivity and concluded that employee-owned companies appear to be
.more profitable than comparable conventionally owned companies.'
Id. (footnotes omitted).
170. See Roel, supra note 44, at 7.
Experts acknowledge that success [of ESOPs] often depends on changes that
require good management-employee relations. They point to some bitter failures,
such as Hyatt-Clark Industries, a New Jersey roller-bearing company where angry
worker-owners went on strike against management. After operating six years as an
ESOP, Hyatt-Clark filed for bankruptcy in 1986.
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pension fund investments, and that some failing companies may even
attempt to use ESOPs to avoid pension liabilities. 7 1 Yet, in spite of

the drawbacks, with proper
safeguards, ESOPs can be beneficial to
1 72
workers and employers.
Do ESOPs promote economic competiveness and collective bargaining? If, indeed, ESOP companies have higher profits and increased productivity by encouraging communication between management and employees, then ESOPs no doubt promote economic
competitiveness. If ESOPs tie the employees' retirement income to

the future success of the company, both parties will have an incentive to avoid discord and to reach accommodation through the collec-

tive bargaining process.
Thus, labor-management cooperative programs such as QWLs
and ESOPs can be used to implement national labor policies.' 73 ESOPs especially appeal to the American imagination because they involve workers in capitalism. Increasingly, as workers become owners,
they will seek to exercise control over management decisions by
171. See MARSHALL, supra note 90, at 197.
172. See Farrell & Hoerr, supra note 36 at 119. This article sets forth the following
guidelines:
WHAT EMPLOYEES SHOULD LOOK FOR IN AN ESOP
INFORMATION The employer should provide education about the ESOP
concept, the rules governing its ESOP, and how it will affect overall compensation.
Workers should receive reports: on sales, profits, productivity, stock price, and how
the company is performing against its competitors.
PARTICIPATION As owners, workers should have the ability to influence
decisions and recommend improvements in quality and in the way work is organized, especially in their immediate area. Employees should be represented on the
board if the ESOP owns a significant block of stock, although this is not required by
law.
VOTING RIGHTS Employees in a privately held company should have the
same right to vote their ESOP stock as other shareholders. That includes the right
to vote for directors, even when not required by state law. In publicly held companies, workers should be able to vote confidentially on tender offers, and ESOP shares
not yet allocated to individuals should be voted in the same proportion by the
trustee.
Id.
173. But see Hoerr, The Payoff From Teamwork, Bus. WIK., July 10, 1989, at 56 (discussing the criticism of labor-management cooperation by union dissidents).
[A]t the recent United Auto Workers convention in Anaheim, California, [i]n
one of the most raucous debates in UAW history, critics made the rafters ring with
charges that [labor-management cooperation] consisted of little more than "co-optation" [of the labor movement] and a new form of the age-old "speedup." But delegates favoring cooperation overwhelmingly voted down the dissidents. And when the
meeting ended on June 23, the UAW's leaders were more strongly committed than
ever to [labor-management cooperative] programs at the Big Three auto makers.
Id. at 57.
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gaining board representation. 1 4 Part IV discusses the conflicts of inunion members, or
terest triggered under federal and state law 7when
5
their representatives, sit in the boardroom.1
IV.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST TRIGGERED BY UNION

REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

Union representation on corporate boards of directors by virtue
of employee ownership can create conflicts of interest under federal
law 76 and state law. Part IV explores how conflicts of interest may
arise under the Landrum-Griffin Act and under state corporation
laws.
A.

Landrum-Griffin Act

Section 501(a) 77 of the Landrum-Griffin Act imposes a fiduciary responsibility upon a union official. Section 501(a) requires a
union official "to refrain from dealing with [the union] as an adverse
party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or
acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the
174. See Moberly, supra note 2, at 769 (noting the argument by which employee representation on boards might be integrated into a statute).
175. See infra text and accompanying notes 176-207.
176. This Note deals with the problems raised under the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 535 (1954) when a union representative sits on a corporate board of
directors. This Note does not deal with federal antitrust problems that may arise in connection
with such an arrangement. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 35, 37 (discussing these
problems). The legality of union representatives sitting on corporate boards of directors has
been addressed by the NLRB and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See id. For example, in 1980, the NLRB General Counsel sustained Douglas Fraser's appointment to the
Chrysler Board of Directors, stating that there was no unlawful conflict of interest under the
NLRA, even though Fraser was the President of the UAW, and, in that capacity, represented
workers at companies in direct competition with Chrysler. Id. at 35 (citing Anchorage Community Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976)). However, when it was proposed in 1981 that
Fraser join the American Motors Board of Directors too, although the Department of Labor
and the FTC approved, the Justice Department declined to state unequivocally that the proposed arrangement would be legal under the antitrust laws. Id. at 37. Thus, as a result of
intragovernmental uncertainty, the UAW and American Motors decided to drop the idea. Id.;
cf. Hatch, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation,38 LAB. L.J.
3, 8 (1987).
No one would argue that permitting a Chrysler executive to sit on the board of
Ford and American Motors would be a clear conflict of interest. Yet, [Schlossberg
and Fetter] suggest that union representatives should be able to sit on the boards of
direct competitors. Fortunately our antitrust laws have to date served as a strong
deterrent to this imprudent, and potentially divisive possibility.
Id.
177. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 501(a), 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 405-531 (1982)).
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interests of [the union] ."178

The purposes of section 501 are to hold officers of labor organizations to a higher standard of responsibility and ethical conduct in
administering affairs of the union, and to protect union officials from
unjust harassment. 79 Federal courts have interpreted section 501(a)
to proscribe "virtually any conflict of interest" that interferes with a

union official's fiduciary responsibility.

s0

Similarly, under state law, corporate directors have a fiduciary

responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation,' 8 ' and by
inference, the shareholders. A conflict of interest may occur if a
board member who is also a union representative must act in the

best interest of all the shareholders rather than in the best interest of
the union membership.' 82 For instance, at a board meeting a director
178. Id.
179. See Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963) (discussing section 501, its
history and the policy behind it).
180. Carroll v. Board of Trustees, 573 F. Supp. 935, 939 (S.D. Ohio 1983). "The misappropriation of union funds . . . appears to have been the main driving force behind the
prohibitions of the [Landrum-Griffin] Act." Id. "But § 501(a) broadly proscribes virtually any
conflict of interest, not just those of a 'pecuniary or personal' nature." Id.
181. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984). This section provides in
putinent part:
§ 8.30 General Standards for Directors
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
Id. (emphasis added).
182. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.31 (1984). This section provides:
§ 8.31 Director Conflict of Interest
(a) A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the corporation in
which a director of the corporation has a direct or indirect interest. A conflict of
interest transaction is not voidable by the corporation solely because of the director's
interest in the transaction if any one of the following is true:
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were
disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee of the board of
directors and the board of directors or committee authorized, approved, or
ratified the transaction;
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were
disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorized,
approved, or ratified the transaction; or
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation.
(b) For purposes of this section, a director of the corporationhas an indirect
interest in a transaction if (1) another entity in which he has a material financial
interest or in which he is a general partner is a party to the transaction or (2)
another entity of which he is a director,officer, or trustee is a party to the transac-
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rnay be required to vote on such issues as plant closings, relocation of
operations, and discontinuance of product lines. While some of these
economizing measures will protect shareholders' interests, they will
impact adversely on union members. Can a union representative sitting on a board of directors adequately and fairly serve two masters,

the shareholders and the union? It is quite possible that their interests are at loggerheads. ls
tion and the transactionis or should be considered by the board of directors of the
corporation.
(c) For purposes of subsection (a)(1), a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified if it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the
directors on the board of directors (or on the committee) who have no direct or
indirect interest in the transaction, but a transaction may not be authorized, approved, or ratified under this section by a single director. If a majority of the directors who have no direct or indirect interest in the transaction vote to authorize,
approve, or ratify the transaction, a quorum is present for the purpose of taking
action under this section. The presence of, or a vote cast by, a director with a direct
or indirect interest in tlhe transaction does not affect the validity of any action taken
under subsection (a)(1) if the transaction is otherwise authorized, approved, or ratified as provided in that subsection.
(d) For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified if it receives the vote of a majority of the shares
entitled to be counted under this subsection. Shares owned by or voted under the
control of a director who has a direct or indirect interest in the transaction, and
shares owned by or voted under the control of an entity described in subsection
(b)(1), may not be counted in a vote of shareholders to determine whether to authorize, approve, or ratify a conflict of interest transaction under subsection (a)(2).
The vote of those shares, however, shall be counted in determining whether the
transaction is approved under other sections of this Act. A majority of the shares,
whether or not present, that are entitled to be counted in a vote on the transaction
under this subsection constitutes a quorum for the purpose of taking action under
this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
183. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 3, at 38.
Consider, for example the case of Continental Steel Corporation in Kokomo,
Indiana, where Stephen L. Hester, a director representing the United Steelworkers
of America, was asked to resign when the company's law firm concluded that his
presence on the board during discussions of labor relations issues would generate a
potential conflict of interest. The issue involved Continental's desire to ask a bankruptcy judge for permission to avoid its labor contract and set new wage terms in
the face of staggering financial losses. Hester offered to forego voting on these issues, but felt that because 'employees have a vital stake in the continuation of the
company,' he should be allowed to voice their interest at board meetings. The company disagreed.
Id. But see MARSHALL, supra note 90, at 164-65.
By contrast, Douglas Fraser, former president of the UAW, believes the presence of
a worker on the board could prevent the closing of a plant, and he was able to do so
as a consequence of his membership on Chrysler's board. Even where closures are
necessary, worker board members get advance notice and might force the company
to provide more relocation help for laid-off workers. Fraser advocates board membership for workers because he believes they must be represented wherever the deci-
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Thus, a union official who is also a board member of an ESOP
company may violate section 501(a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act because the directorship may be a "personal interest which conflicts
'
with the interest of [the union]." 184

B.

State Corporation Laws

Corporate governance is a matter of state law. 8 5 The Supreme
Court, recognizing that corporations are creatures of state law, de-

clined to impose a federal fiduciary obligation on corporate directors."' 6 The Supreme Court reasoned that "[f]ederal courts applying
a 'federal fiduciary principle'

. . .

could be expected to depart from

state fiduciary standards at least to the extent necessary to ensure
uniformity within the federal system,"' 87 which would create
problems under the Erie doctrine. 8 Consequently, in analyzing a
director's responsibilities to the corporation, and conflicts of interest

arising out of those responsibilities, state corporation laws apply.
The common law of corporations, developed on a case-by-case
basis by state courts, identifies a fiduciary duty of undivided and unsions are being made.

Id.
184.

Landrum Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 501, 73 Stat. 535 (1959).

185. R.W.

HAMILTON CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS

154-55 (3d ed. 1986).

The emphasis on state corporation law . . . should not be misinterpreted. A
significant portion of the modern law of corporations is federal in origin. There is
already a significant amount of federal regulation based primarily on two New Deal
era statutes, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In
a sense, of course, these statutes were a response to the perceived inadequacy of
state regulation of corporations in the period before the Great Depression, but they
did not create a pervasive scheme of federal regulation. Nevertheless, until about
1975 there appeared to be a trend toward the gradual expansion of the 'federal law
of corporations under these two statutes at the expense of state law and state courts.
However, as a result of several restrictive United States Supreme Court opinions
since 1975 the trend toward the federalization of the law of corporations appears to
have stopped and the trend may actually have been reversed.
Id. (emphasis added).
186. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (stating that "[c]orporations are creatures of
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.").
187. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (footnote omitted).
188. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964). In Van Dusen the Court noted
that Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 54 (1938), had:
expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial powers between State and federal courts. . . . [T]he policy that underlies [Erie] is . . . [that
if a suit is brought by a] litigant in federal court instead of in a State court a block
away [that fact alone] should not lead to a substantially different result.
Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
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selfish loyalty owed by a director to the corporation and, by inference, to the shareholders.18 A salient feature of the fiduciary relationship is that a director may have no conflict between duty and
self-interest. 190 When states began to codify the common law of corporations, the statutes of the various states described the director's
fiduciary duty and set forth definitions of director conflict of interest.
The RMBCA is a model uniform act designed for use by the states
in drafting their corporation statutes; 191 therefore, its provisions are
illustrative of the corporation laws of the various states. Section
8.30(a) 192 describes a director's fiduciary duty and section 8.31193
sets forth a definition of director conflict of interest.
A union official who is also a director has a fiduciary duty to the
corporation because of the standards imposed by section 8.30(a) of
the RMBCA.194 As a result of that fiduciary relationship, the union
official/director has a potential conflict of interest between his duty
of loyalty to the corporation and his duty of loyalty to the union
under section 501(a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act. 19 Suppose, for example, that the board of directors is considering such options as
plant closing, relocation of operations, and discontinuance of product
lines to change the nature and direction of the corporation's business. Under FNM and its progeny, such decisions are entrepreneurial in nature, but the corporation must bargain with the
union over their "effects" on the workers.'96 Therefore, the union
189. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 6 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) provides a classic common law
holding regarding fiduciary duty:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge

of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate . . . director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation commit-

ted to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to
the corporation or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability

might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to
the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and selfinterest.
Id. (emphasis added), cited with approval in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710
(Del. 1983).
190. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.

191.

See supra text and accompanying note 41 (discussing the RMBCA).

192.

See supra note 181 (setting forth this section).

193. See supra note 182 (setting forth this section).
194.

See supra note 175 (setting forth this section).

195.

Landrum Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 501, 73 Stat. 535 (1959). "The of-

ficers, agents, . . . and other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust
in relation to such organization and its members as a group .
I..."
Id.

196. See supra text accompanying notes 47-77 (discussing FNM).
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official/director must consider the proposals from the point of view
of a corporate fiduciary; i.e., in accordance with the standards imposed by section 8.30(a).197 Would he be able to disregard the impact that those measures would have on the job security of union
members? Would those proposals be "conflict of interest transactions" under section 8.31 of the RMBCA?
Section 8.31(a) states that a "conflict of interest transaction is a
transaction with the corporation in which a director

. . .

has a direct

or indirect interest."' 98 Section 8.31(b) describes an indirect interest
in a transaction. "[A] director has an indirect interest in a transaction if. . .another entity of which he is a director, officer, or trustee
is a party to the transaction and the transaction is . .. considered by
the board of directors."' 19 9 Under section 1.40(9), 00 an unincorpo-

rated association such as a union is an entity. Thus, the union official/director has an indirect interest in the transaction because the
unincorporated association of which he is an officer or trustee201 is a
party to the transaction. That is, a plant closing, or relocation or
discontinuance of product line triggers the corporation's duty to bargain with the union under the collective bargaining agreement.
On the other hand, section 8.31(c)10 2 provides that a conflict of
interest transaction can be "authorized, approved or ratified by the
affirmative vote of a majority of the directors with no

. .

.interest in

20 3

the transaction.
In other words, the union official/director can
abstain from voting on the conflict of interest transaction. However,
what purpose does the union derive out of board membership if its
designated board member cannot consider and vote upon issues of
vital concern to the workers?
Alternatively, section 8.31(d) provides that a conflict of interest
transaction can be authorized, approved, or ratified if it receives the
vote of a majority of the shareholders, but "the shares owned by or
voted under the control of [the union] may not be counted. ' 2 4 Sup197.
198.

See supra note 181 (setting forth this section).
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) (1984).
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.31(b) (1984).

199.
200. REVISED MODEL BuSINESS CORP. ACT § 1.40(9) (1984). "'Entity' includes corporation and foreign corporation; not-for-profit corporation; profit and not-for-profit unincorporated association; business trust, estate, partnership, trust, and two or more persons having a
joint or common economic interest; and state, United States, and foreign government." Id.
201. Assuming the union official/director is not an "officer" of the union, an argument
could be made that he is a "trustee" of the union. There is no definition of "trustee" in the
RMBCA. Therefore, this matter needs clarification.
202. See supra note 182 (setting forth this section).
203. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 8.31(c) (1984).
204. See supra note 182 (setting forth this section).
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pose that the proposal to close a plant is narrowly defeated by the
board, and that the union official/director votes with the majority.
Suppose also that the minority of the board who voted in favor of the
closing asks for shareholder authorization, approval or ratification.
The shareholders most likely to vote to keep the plant open-the
employee-shareholders--cannot vote. In this situation, the vote of
the union official/director is virtually meaningless.
Consequently, neither section 8.31(c) nor 8.31(d) provides a
useful solution to potential conflict of interest situations.
Of course, a union may designate someone other than a union
member to represent the union on the employer's board of directors.
Nonetheless, under the laws of agency,20 5 the union designee would
arguably be a "trustee" of the union under section 8.31(b). Essentially, the designee would stand in the shoes of a union official and
have the same conflict of interest problems.
Thus, union representation on corporate boards creates conflicts
of interest under the Landrum-Griffin Act as well as under the
RMBCA. Of course, framers of ESOPs may recommend that the
articles of incorporation and bylaws be amended to solve some of
these problems so that the union can have an effective voice on the
board. 20 6 However, prevailing legal opinion is that "Congress had no
expectation that the elected union representative would become an
equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the
union's members are employed. 20 7 It is difficult to see how that view
can be reconciled with union representation on corporate boards of
directors.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note attempted to assess whether labor-management cooperative programs can foster economic competitiveness and promote
collective bargaining between two equal and independent entities.
Labor-management cooperation through QWLs and ESOPs evolved
in an environment unsympathetic to union demands for higher wages
and more benefits, especially in view of America's dwindling share of
the world market. In FNM, the Supreme Court restricted manage205.

An agency is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation

of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
206. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Act § 2.06(b) (1984). "The bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision for managing the business and regulating the affairs of the
corporation that is not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation." Id.
207.

First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
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ment's duty to bargain over entrepreneurial decisions and began a
trend in the NLRB and the lower courts that redefined the roles of
management and labor in the collective bargaining process.10 8 That
trend comports with the national policy of economic competitiveness
but upsets the equilibrium between labor and management contemplated by the NLRA.
Against that background, it was inevitable that QWLs would
proliferate. As labor's bargaining power declined, management had
to persuade workers to adopt company goals while accepting
givebacks. Management initiated QWLs for that purpose, on the
theory that contented workers are more productive workers. However, collective bargaining is frustrated when non-unionized companies develop QWLs because QWLs cannot perform the functions of
labor organizations. On the other hand, union challenges to employer-initiated QWLs under section 8(a)(2) can prevent employer
domination of QWLs and assure that employees are exercising their
free choice in foregoing union representation.2 9
ESOPs are quickly becoming the favored form of labor-management cooperation. ESOPs enable workers to become capitalists,
thereby increasing their wealth and their potential for consumption.
Increased consumption, in turn, stimulates the economy. Furthermore, companies can use ESOPs to thwart corporate raiders, reduce
the price of pension plans, and reap tax savings. When workers become owners, they generally want a voice in management. However,
conflicts of interests abound when union representatives are also
board members.21 0 Nonetheless, the idea is not implausible; perhaps
union officials should advise the board of directors on entrepreneurial
decisions which may adversely affect employees to ensure that the
decision itself is deliberately considered. 211 As advisors, union officials would not be acting as equal partners with management in the
business enterprise. Therefore, the individual integrity of labor and
management is retained, as contemplated in the NLRA.
Carol A. Glick

208.
209.
210.
211.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 47-77 (Part II).
supra text accompanying notes 78-175 (Part III).
supra text accompanying notes 176-207 (Part IV).
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 680.
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